Iran’s Strategic Goals
August 2017
The “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria is undergoing a process of disintegration and ISIS will
return to its “natural state” of a jihadist terror organization, not a “state” with territorial
borders. The defeats experienced by ISIS in Iraq and Syria, central among them the loss of
Mosul, the battle in Raqqa and the advances of Syrian forces in Deir Ezzor, create new
opportunities for Iran to increase its influence in Syria, Iraq and the entire Middle East.
Iran, which previously displayed dexterity in exploiting every opportunity to enhance
its standing as a regional power, wishes to capitalize on the vacuum created in Syria and
Iraq by ISIS’ defeat, to advance its ambitions in the region and play a central role in
shaping the post-ISIS Middle East. Iran’s actions in Syria and Iraq are part of a
comprehensive Iranian strategy of striving for regional hegemony. Iran wishes to
increase its influence over states and organizations in the region, while preventing forces
under Western and American patronage from taking root in Syria, Iraq or any other country.
Iran’s regional meddling is intended not only to implement its ideology but mainly to
realize Iranian national interests, which are perceived by Tehran as vital.
In its current policy in Syria and Iraq, Iran wishes to further several central goals:
Securing and shaping the Syrian regime: Preserving the regime of President Assad,
assisting its stabilization and increasing Iranian influence over it are vital goals for
Iran. This policy stems from the Syrian regime's role as a strategic ally of Iran in the
Arab world, and due to possible negative ramifications of Assad’s downfall on
Lebanese Hezbollah, which relies on the crucial Syrian logistical hub for transfers of
Iranian assistance to it. In addition, Syria’s location at the heart of the Arab world is
perceived as an important geo-political center from which Iran could, in the
future, conduct a subversive policy to advance its regional hegemony.
Reinforcing a sphere of Iranian-Shi’ite influence, stretching from Iran through
Iraq to Syria and Lebanon and the Mediterranean. In this sphere of influence, Iran
can create a land corridor from Iran to Syria and to Lebanon. Such a corridor
would provide Iran with another route for transferring forces, weapons and
equipment to Syria and Lebanon. This in addition to the aerial route, which Iran
frequently uses now, and the maritime route, which Iran has utilized several times
in the past. It appears that Iran also wishes to obtain access to the Mediterranean,
and gain a long-term military foothold in Syria (although senior Iranian officials
have denied such intentions).
Bolstering the pressure mechanisms and escalating the threat posed to Israel,
while creating a state of deterrence. This is mainly by augmenting the military
capabilities of Hezbollah, developing the abilities of Hezbollah to manufacture
weapons, and establishing local terror networks in the Golan Heights, with the
aim of creating a new front for challenging Israel. It appears to us that according
to Iran’s view, the networks forged in the Golan Heights will be made up of
Hezbollah operatives, members of Shi'ite militias supported by Iran and local actors
from the region.1
Maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity, with a government dominated by the
Shia and allied and under the influence of Iran. To promote this political goal, Iran
fosters Shi'ite militias in Iraq that operate under its influence (“the Popular
Mobilization Committee”, PMC), allowing Iran to advance its aims inside Iraq
through these militias.

1 In the past, a Shi’ite Iraqi operative, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandes, who serves as the Deputy Commander
of the Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC, an umbrella structure of Shia militias operating under
Iranian patronage), stated that if Hassan Nasrallah asked to turn toward Israel if conflict erupts,
the PMC will do so. In this context see our publication from July 20, 2017: “Iran’s interests and intent
in Iraq and Syria reflected in statements by senior commanders of the Popular Mobilization
Committee, the umbrella organization of the Shi’ite militias in Iraq handled by the Iranian Qods Force”.
Dislodging the United States from the region. The U.S. is perceived by Iran as a
major threat to its national security and vital interests. The first step to realizing
this goal is by diminishing American influence in Syria and Iraq in the phase
following the capture of Mosul and Raqqa, and subsequently, Iran aims to blunt
American influence in other countries across the Middle East.
Increasing Iran’s political, economic, religious and cultural influence in Syria,
Iraq and Lebanon. This is while exploiting the weakness of the central governments
in those countries and the opportunities found in the process of rebuilding the
economies and infrastructure in Syria and Iraq, which have been devastated by the
wars raging in those countries over the past few years. An important tool for the
accomplishment of this goal are the Shi’ite communities residing in those
countries (and in Syria, the Alawite community), which are experiencing sectarian
tensions with the neighboring Sunni Muslim communities.

To realize its strategic goals, Iran continues to invest most of its efforts in Syria in
stabilizing the rule of the Assad regime and expanding the territories under its
control. Despite the significant gains of Assad regime forces, a decisive victory is yet to
be achieved, and the military effort continues to pose a major challenge to Iran and the
IRGC, and take a heavy toll on its manpower and that of its clients.
Iran intends to utilize the forces operating under the command of the IRGC to establish
itself in areas from which the Syrian rebels and ISIS have been expelled, with the
aim of creating a sphere of influence stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to
Lebanon and the Mediterranean. Ground lines of control from east to west would allow
direct Iranian access to its allies in Syria and Lebanon. The Iranian effort to establish
this corridor is being realized by the advancement of forces supportive of the Assad
regime, including Hezbollah and Shi'ite militias operating under IRGC patronage (the
PMC), to central crossing points on the Iraq-Syria border. Iran encourages the
organizations under its tutelage in Iraq and in Syria to operate near the Iraqi-Syrian
border.
Obstacles Hindering the Realization of Iran’s Interests
Iran faces several fundamental obstacles when attempting to establish itself as
a powerful player in the Arab realm of the Middle East. First, as a country with a
Persian majority, it is perceived in the Arab world, and even among its allies, as a foreign
actor that at time conducts itself in a haughty and even racist manner toward its Arab
neighbors. Second, the Shi’ite Iran is struggling to realize regional hegemony in a sphere
that is mostly Sunni Muslim. The use of local proxy organizations allows Iran to
camouflage its direct involvement in this arena, but there are also inherent problems in a
strategy that relies on operating proxies, which at times have their own interests and do
now follow the Iranian dictate to the letter.
The creation of an Iranian sphere of influence in western Iraq and eastern Syria
and establishment of a land corridor from Iran in the direction of the Mediterranean
is especially challenging for Iran. The government of Iraq (with American
encouragement) may hinder the transfer of weapons through this route. In addition,
parts of this route are controlled by forces opposed to Iranian meddling, such as the
Kurdish militias supported by the United States or the Sunni communities residing in
western and central Iraq. After losing Mosul, ISIS will likely change its combat patterns
and revert to guerrilla tactics and terrorism, and may obstruct the movement of
vehicles along the land corridor.
The actions of the superpowers and other governments in the region, and especially
those of Russia, the United States and Turkey, also undercut Iran’s ability to realize its
aim of regional hegemony and frustrate its hope of forging eastern Syria and western Iraq
as parts of its sphere of influence. In Syria, Russia has become the dominant player, and
Iran has had to settle for a secondary role in the military and political developments
that have occurred over the past year (which creates tensions in the relationship
between Iran and Russia). Another actor competing with Iran in Syria (and beyond) is
Turkey, which wishes to play a central role in combatting ISIS and shaping the political
deals concerning Syria’s future. In addition, it is likely that Sunni Turkey will view
increasing Shi’ite influence spearheaded by Iran as harmful to its interests.
Iran’s efforts to gain influence in this arena may lead to greater strife with the
United States, especially during the Trump presidency. Iran eyes with concern American
activity against Syrian regime forces and sees it as a new phase in the battle to shape
Syria in the day after ISIS and as an “American plot,” which aims to curtail Iranian
influence. In addition, the Iranian presence in Syria increases the likelihood of friction
with Israel and may lead to an escalation between the two countries at a timing that is
not suitable for Iran.
Inside Iran, Iranian involvement in Syria too poses a challenge. The prolonged
military operations in Syria continue to exact a heavy human toll and financial cost
from Iran and its proxies, which at time arouse internal criticism, and fan the flames of
conflict with ISIS (as was evident in the multi-pronged terrorist attack carried out by the
organization in Tehran on June 7, 2017). In addition, Iran’s drive for hegemony in the
Middle East may require it to increase its “investments” in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and
other conflict arenas, which may further inflame domestic criticism.
ISIS' waning power creates new opportunities for Iran to expand its influence in
Iraq. Unlike in Syria, Iran’s direct military presence in Iraq is extremely limited and is
primarily based on the Iraqi Shi'ite militias (“the Popular Mobilization Committee”,
PMC), most of which operate under direct or indirect patronage of the IRGC. These militias
play an important role in the domestic arena in Iraq, which may even increase following the
end of the campaign against ISIS, when they demand their place in the new political order
in Iraq. It appears that most of the militias are loyal to Iran and the ability of the central
government in Baghdad to impose its will on them is in doubt.
Iran sees its involvement in Iraq as an essential mean for maintaining its influence in the
country and preventing American presence and influence there, which are perceived by
Iran as a threat to its national interests. According to Tehran, ISIS’ enfeeblement may
accelerate the confrontation against the United States over power in Iraq. Iran strives to
neutralize American influence in Iraq, which has increased during the campaign against
ISIS, and especially during the battle for Mosul.
As with its policy in Syria, Iran is moving to increase its influence in Iraq in the
economic, cultural and religious spheres as well. Iran invests great efforts in augmenting
the volume of trade with Iraq, it has taken over several oil fields in the border region with
Iraq, and Iran may assist in rebuilding the areas captured from ISIS. Iran is also pursuing
efforts to increase its religious influence in the Iraqi cities considered holy by the Shi’ite
community.
Iranian assistance provided a significant contribution to stymieing ISIS but also
resulted in growing criticism inside Iraq against Iran’s interference in Iraq’s domestic
affairs. This criticism reflects the complexity of the Shi’ite political arena in Iraq, which
encompasses a multitude of differing and even opposing views regarding Iran’s
involvement in the country. Over the past two years, the Shi’ite cleric and politician,
Muqtada al-Sadr, has led the opposition to Iran’s involvement in Iraq. Al-Sadr was
considered a protégé of Iran, but over the past few years, has drifted away from the Iranians
and began publicly criticizing Iran’s meddling in Iraq. Iran is troubled by his growing
activism, and especially his burgeoning ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran's main regional rival.
Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, who was appointed to his position in the summer of
2014 replacing the pro-Iranian Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, has also adopted an
independent posture vis-à-vis Iran. At the heart of al-Abadi’s policy is the desire to avoid
becoming an “Iranian puppet.” Iraq also has an underlying interest to continue receiving
American support and to maintain positive relations with the Sunni Arab states, chief
among them Saudi Arabia. The entry of Turkey as another player in the Iraqi scene is also
perceived as a threat by Iran, which is troubled by Turkey’s aim of cementing its hold over
northern Iraq.
Another challenge Iran is facing comes from the Kurds in northern Iraq. Iran is
troubled by the transformation of the Kurdistan region in Iraq into a de-facto
independent state. According to Tehran’s view, this may jeopardize Iraq’s territorial
integrity, harm Iran's efforts to secure its grip over Iraq and embolden separatist
aspirations among the Kurdish minority in Iran. Iran’s concern is clearly evident in its
public opposition to raising of the Kurdistan flag in the city of Kirkuk in northern Iraq and its
efforts to prevent the holding of the independence referendum in the Kurdish region.
In sum, ISIS’ decline in Syria and Iraq and its transformation from an “Islamic State” to a
terrorist and guerilla organization creates a window of opportunity for Iran to realize its
regional goals and expand its influence. The first priorities are Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and
Yemen, over which Iran already has a strong grip. Nevertheless, Iran’s ability to cement its
influence is constrained by fundamental characteristic of the Middle Eastern system,
chief among them the demographic composition of the region and the competing influence
of other regional and international players. Iran’s ability to increase its influence in the region
depends not only on its intensions and desires, but also on the policies of the rest of the state
and non-state actors, international and local, operating in the region, and their decisions
whether to facilitate Iran’s ambitions or challenge its efforts to establish a sphere of influence
under the Iranian dominan
Source :http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/iran-post-isis-era-aims-opportunities-challenges/
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