Background In a rare piece of good news for Iraq, there have been reports this month that Iraq expects to double last year’s wheat harvest in 2019. According to a spokesman for the agriculture ministry, an increase in planted areas, following strong rains, was largely responsible for the extra harvest. The prospect of a bumper wheat harvest has come against difficult odds: last year, the Iraqi Government announced that it would halve the irrigated area that it plants with wheat. As a result of this, predictions indicated that cereal production would be over four million tonnes below average. Instead, current estimates suggest that Iraq will double the amount of wheat it grew in 2018.   Comment Although a better than expected wheat harvest is a good sign for Iraq, the country has far too many environmental and structural challenges to assume that this situation will continue in the future. The country’s ongoing water crisis was responsible for last year’s decision to cut the area of irrigated land. Most of Iraq’s water comes from rivers, particularly the Tigris and Euphrates. Iraq is a downstream riparian and, as a result, is vulnerable to the actions of its upstream neighbours, especially Turkey and Iran. Heavy damming in these countries and the effects of climate change and poor management have been responsible for at least a 40 per centreduction in river flows through Iraq. Additionally, the strong rain Iraq experienced late last year is unlikely to be a regular occurrence. Rainfall over Iraq has decreased by between 1.3 and 6.2 millimetres per year over the last century and the trend has accelerated in recent years. There has also been a reduction in the number of cool nights, while maximum temperatures have increased, putting further strain on surface water resources. As a result, both rain-fed and irrigated agriculture are at risk from the country’s increasingly vulnerable water resources. Environmental pressures are not solely responsible for Iraq’s agricultural instability. A fragmented and often uninterested political class also deserves much of the blame. Although Iraq is a middle-income country, it experiences high rates of poverty, especially in rural areas, where incomes are largely generated through farming. This is, in part, because Iraq’s economy is heavily dominated by oil. About 99 per cent of the country’s revenue is generated in the oil sector and the sector’s dominance has led policy makers to neglect agriculture (and other industries). Despite providing employment for 25 per cent of Iraqis, agriculture only contributes five per cent to the national GDP, which reflects the low levels of investment that the sector receives. Several years of economic turmoil have made dysfunctional and corrupt government agencies even less equipped to implement policy changes that would help revive the agricultural sector. This is especially true in northern Iraq, which was traditionally the most productive agricultural region in the country and the one most negatively affected by the war with Islamic State. This poses a particular risk for Iraq, where agricultural infrastructure is generally outdated, worn-out, or has simply been destroyed by conflict. Irrigation systems, in particular, are poorly maintained and inefficient water use and rising salinity are likely to put further pressures on those systems. There are currently no incentives in place to encourage investment in Iraqi agriculture and the need to access private finance has been a particular impediment to farmers. As a result, access to inputs and improved infrastructure are beyond the grasp of the typical smallholder farmer. Iraq’s isolation from the international community has also meant that farmers have no access to international markets, leaving them dependent on Iraq’s artificially low food prices. Even if the will to improve the sector were present, rampant corruption and weak institutional capacity limit the ability of the Iraqi Government to do very much at all to improve a highly vulnerable agricultural sector.