Bridging the Gap in the Nile Waters Dispute- International Crisis Group
- 20.03.2019
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International Crisis Group
Africa Report N°271 20 March 2019
Executive Summary
The three-way dispute among Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan over the sharing of the Nile
waters remains deadlocked. An April 2018 leadership transition in Ethiopia eased
tensions between Cairo and Addis Ababa. But the parties have made little headway
in resolving the crisis triggered by Ethiopia’s 2011 decision to build the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (GERD), expected to be the largest hydropower plant in Africa.
Egypt fears that the dam will drastically reduce water flow downstream and thus
imperil its national security. Ethiopia and Sudan assert their right to exploit the Nile
waters to further develop their economies. The three countries need to act now to
avert a graver crisis when the dam comes online. They should accede to immediate
steps to mitigate damage, particularly during the filling of the dam’s reservoir, when
water flow to downstream countries could decline. Next, they and other riparian
states should seek a long-term transboundary agreement on resource sharing that
balances the needs of countries up and down the Nile basin and offers a framework
for averting conflict over future projects.
The stakes in the dispute are high. Egypt relies on the Nile for about 90 per cent
of its freshwater needs. Its government argues that tampering with the river’s flow
would put millions of farmers out of work and threaten the country’s food supply. In
Ethiopia, engineers estimate that the GERD will produce about 6,450 megawatts of
electricity, a hydropower jackpot that would boost the country’s aspirations to attain
middle-income status by 2025. Authorities have sold the dam as a defining national
endeavour: millions of Ethiopians bought bonds to finance its construction, helping
implant the initiative in the national psyche. Fervent public support for the dam has
recently cooled, however, following allegations of financial mismanagement.
Between 2011 and 2017, Egyptian and Ethiopian leaders framed the GERD dispute
in stark, hyper-nationalist terms and exchanged belligerent threats. Politicians in
Cairo called for sabotaging the dam. Media outlets in both countries compared the
two sides’ military strength in anticipation of hostilities.
A recent rapprochement has quieted the row. Ethiopia’s new prime minister, Abiy
Ahmed, visited Cairo in June 2018 and promised to ensure that Ethiopia’s development
projects do not harm Egypt. In turn, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi
said his country recognises that the dispute has no military solution. But despite the
warming relations, there has been little substantive progress toward a resolution.
Political upheaval in all three countries complicates this task to varying degrees.
In Sudan, President Omar al-Bashir, in power since 1989, is clinging precariously to
his job amid the most sustained wave of protest the country has seen in decades. In
Ethiopia, Abiy, while enormously popular with the public, is struggling to consolidate
his hold on power. Egypt’s Sisi is relatively secure in his position, but his drive
to extend his stay in office until at least 2034 has divided the military establishment,
his key domestic constituency. These internal dynamics mean that the leaders dedicate
less time to the Nile dam issue than they should. They could blunder into a crisis
if they do not strike a bargain before the GERD begins operation.
Egyptian, Ethiopian and Sudanese authorities should consider a phased approach
to agreeing on a way forward. Most urgent is the question of how quickly to fill the
dam’s reservoir. At first, Ethiopia proposed filling it in three years, while Egypt suggested
a process lasting up to fifteen. To achieve a breakthrough on this question,
Ethiopia should fully cooperate with its downstream partners and support studies
seeking to outline an optimal fill rate timeline. If necessary, the three countries should
seek third-party support from a mutually agreed-upon partner to break the impasse.
Ethiopia should also agree to stagger the fill rate so that it picks up pace in years with
plentiful rains, which would minimise disruption of water flows.
To reduce mutual suspicion, leaders should take a number of confidence-building
measures. Prime Minister Abiy should invite his Egyptian and Sudanese counterparts
to tour the GERD construction site, thus highlighting Ethiopia’s willingness to
address downstream countries’ concerns. Such a demonstration of Ethiopian goodwill
could afford the Egyptian authorities the space to make necessary adjustments,
notably improving inefficient water management systems. For its part, Cairo should
declare that it will not support armed Ethiopian opposition groups, to allay Addis
Ababa’s fears.
Outside partners could help build confidence. The European Investment Bank,
which the Ethiopians perceive as less pro-Egyptian than the World Bank, might offer
Addis funding for the last phase of dam construction. Such funding could be conditional
on Ethiopia cooperating on sticking points such as the fill rate. The EU should
continue its talks with downstream countries on potential guarantees (including loans)
and other instruments to support those countries in years in which drought or other
shocks endanger food security. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
as well as Qatar and Turkey, could offer bilateral or trilateral investment in agriculture
in Ethiopia and/or Sudan that afford Egypt a discounted and reliable supply of
staples, notably wheat and rice. The U.S. and China, which enjoy close ties to some
Nile basin governments, could also encourage parties to resolve their disputes before
the GERD is completed.
Next, authorities in Addis Ababa, Cairo and Khartoum should lay the ground for
more substantive discussions of a long-term framework for Nile basin management
to avert similar crises in the future. Egypt should rejoin the Nile Basin Initiative, the
only forum that brings together all riparian countries and the best venue available
for discussing mutually beneficial resource sharing. Such talks would consider Egyptian
proposals that, in the future, upstream countries carry out major development
projects in consultation with downstream nations. A permanent institutional framework
could also help the countries prepare for challenges down the road, including
climate change-induced environmental shocks, notably variable rainfall patterns,
which could cause greater water stress.
Outside partners should encourage Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan to approach the
dispute not as an existential conflict but as a chance to establish a resource-sharing
partnership. Delays in the GERD’s completion and the improved mood following
Prime Minister Abiy’s ascent make this moment propitious for negotiating a way
forward. Waiting until the dam is operational – when its impact on downstream countries
is clearer – would raise the risk of violent conflict.
Nairobi/Abu Dhabi/Istanbul/Brussels, 20 March 2019
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